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For ordinary judgements it is often the case that it may be justifiable to change 
one's mind given that others agree in holding an opposing view. In the case of 
judgements of beauty this is never the case; these are autonomous. Robert 
Hopkins has discussed the following (familiar) explanation: Judgements of 
beauty are not genuine assertions at all; rather they are expressions of some 
response or experience. Since to acknowledge the disagreement of others is 
not to respond to objects as they do, this acknowledgement needn't (nor could 
it) render it appropriate to change one's aesthetic judgement (Hopkins 2001: 
166-189). 
This kind of response would only be satisfactory were it able to account for 
another feature of our aesthetic discourse: that there can be genuine 
disagreements over beauty – that when these occur at least one party in the 
conflict has infringed on the norms at issue. In this context we see the 
attraction of a form of quasi-realism about beauty. However, Hopkins 
concludes that the quasi-realist account cannot be motivated. In the following 
analysis I want to re-open the debate with the suggestion that the quasi-realist 
has a potential explanation of the phenomena at issue and is able to avoid the 
criticisms Hopkins discusses. By shifting the onus of explanation away from 
the quasi-realist, I think we uncover something interesting about autonomous 
judgements in general. 
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I. THE POSSIBILITY OF QUASI-REALISM 
Hopkins draws the autonomous characterisation from Kant: 
 
…[The judger] clearly perceives that the approval of others affords no valid proof, 
available for the estimate of beauty. He recognises that others, perchance, may see 
and observe for him, and that, what many have seen in one and the same way may, 
for the purpose of a theoretical, and therefore logical judgement, serve as an 
adequate ground of proof for him, albeit he believes he saw otherwise, but that 
what has pleased others can never serve him as the ground of an aesthetic 
judgment. The judgement of others, where unfavourable to ours, may, no doubt, 
rightly make us suspicious in respect of our own, but convincing us that it is wrong 
it never can. 
      Critique of Judgement, Part 1, §33 
 
This autonomy of disinterested pleasure ensures that in the case of genuine conflict, 
one can't simply adopt the opposing judgement, for one must experience the 
disinterested pleasure oneself in order to make a genuine aesthetic judgement. 
However in such cases Kant thinks this will give cause to place less confidence in 
one's own view; in such cases one should, where possible, test the issue by re-
examining the object. Yet, when one finds oneself disagreeing with several others 
who share a view for ordinary empirical matters this can be reason enough to adopt 
their view. The question thus raised by Hopkins is why this contrast holds (Hopkins 
2001: 169). How could judgements of taste be autonomous as other judgements are 
not?  
Hopkins suggests, following Crispin Wright (1992), that in standard cases 
empirical talk is subject to cognitive command: When disagreement arises it will be a 
priori that one side must lack warrant; that either my opponent or I will be at fault. I 
can then deploy fault considerations to find out which: 
   
Fault Consideration:  Since my opponents outnumber me; in 
general I and they are equally competent in matters of this sort; all 
have tried to access the facts in the same way - it is more likely that I 
am at cognitive fault than that they are. 
   
Hence I ought to reject my view and accept theirs. 
In constructing a plausible quasi-realism about the aesthetic Hopkins offers 
something analogous to cognitive command such that when conflict occurs one party 
will be at fault. Although this will not constitute cognitive fault it will still imply the 
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notion of warrant in capturing a violation of the norms governing our expressive 
discourse with genuine judgements of taste. For such norms we appeal to Kant's 
notion of the pure, disinterested judgements of taste. For he does hold it to be a priori 
that when conflicting judgements of taste are made, either one party is expressing an 
interested pleasure, or one is unintentionally making a judgement of dependant beauty 
(and thus expresses a pleasure based on the application of concepts). So we have a 
structural analogue to cognitive command on the expressivist picture, and thus a form 
of quasi-realism. 
 
II. AGAINST QUASI-REALISM 
Of course I reported that Hopkins argues against the viability of a quasi-realist 
account – here is his basic argument. Given this quasi-realist account, Hopkins 
believes the following two 'fault allocating' arguments - (A) as applicable in the case 
of non-aesthetic judgements, (B) as applicable in aesthetic cases – to be formally on a 
par. Each justifies, the quasi-realist should admit, a change of mind given the fault 
considerations. Hopkins believes it is this that casts doubt on the ability of any form 
of quasi-realism to explain aesthetic autonomy.  
 
Argument A: 
 
(1a) I and my opponents disagree over whether p 
(2)  One of us is at fault 
(3)   They outnumber me, in general I and they are equally competent in 
matters of this sort, and we've all tried to access the facts in the same way. 
So 
(4)   It is likely that I am at fault. 
So 
(5a)  p/¬p [i.e. whichever claim the opponents make] 
 
Argument B: 
 
(1b) I and my opponents disagree over whether O is beautiful 
(2) One of us is at fault 
(3) They outnumber me, in general I and they are equally competent in matters        
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of this sort, and we've all tried to access the facts in the same way. 
So 
(4) It is likely that I am at fault. 
So 
(5b) O is beautiful/ It is not the case that O is beautiful [i.e. whichever claim the 
opponents make] 
 
Hopkins holds that the quasi-realist must accept - given (A) - that an argument of 
this form can justify, in the aesthetic context, someone in the move from (1)-(4). In so 
doing one will become (as was hoped) more cautious and willing to try the matter by 
experiencing the disputed object anew. Under the quasi-realist's commitment to 
expressivism, one should be protected from the pressure to move from (4) to (5) if one 
lacks the appropriate response to the object in question. However, Hopkins objects 
that it is not clear why this should be so. Argument (B), in reflecting the form of (A), 
does commit the judger to a change of mind in the aesthetic case. We would expect 
the quasi-realist to be committed to the view that expressive claims can play a role in 
cogent arguments, so we should expect the conclusion to follow. In light of this 
commitment Hopkins does not believe the quasi-realist can have anything to say to 
explain or to save autonomy (for discussion see Hopkins 2001: 181-5). 
 
III. A RESPONSE TO HOPKINS 
I think the quasi-realist is able to secure a viable interpretation of (B). I am going to 
suggest that Hopkins's argument (B) leads to a weaker conclusion about probability. It 
doesn't, nor should it, appear as an analogue of (A) but as a diversion from (A), so my 
main purpose in the following is to bring out the nature of this difference. By 
discussing the reason for this divergence I hope to motivate acceptance of the kind of 
move I suggest. 
Given the reliance on various assumptions in the fault consideration (3) the 
conclusion in (4) can be no stronger than 'It is likely that I am at fault'. Anything more 
forceful in the light of (1)-(3) would not be warranted. This likelihood is based on the 
assumption that the 'force of many' is constituted by their being of equal competency 
to the lone judger; having used the same methods to reach their judgements etc. But if 
in the face of such conflict one can conclude only that 'It is likely that I am at fault', 
one might expect the likelihood locution to carry over into (5b) also. The strength of 
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the final step is derived from the a priori nature of (2) and the subsequent issue of 
warrant that arises. Yet it is surely possible for the premises to be true and the 
conclusion false so we can’t expect deductive validity here. The move to a conclusion 
presented in terms of likelihood appears motivated by the inductive feel to the 
argument. As such (B) might be more appropriately construed as follows: 
 
Argument B'  
 
(1b') I and my opponents disagree over whether O is beautiful 
(2) One of us is at fault 
(3) They outnumber me, in general I and they are equally competent in matters 
of this sort, and we've all tried to access the facts in the same way. 
So 
(4) It is likely that I am at fault. 
So 
(5b') It is likely that O is beautiful/ It is likely that it is not the case that O is 
beautiful [i.e. whichever claim the opponents make]. 
 
This argument offers a form of quasi-realism by embracing Hopkins’ notion of 
fault consideration in (B) but offering instead a weaker analogue to the assertoric 
force found in (5b). But what does the conclusion to (B') mean? Although it might be 
thought clumsy or incoherent this is explained by the fact that it does not express a 
genuine assertion, merely (at best) a quasi-assertion.1 Incoherence might be thought to 
issue from the judger’s retained autonomy in the light of the move to (5b'). However, 
despite appearances it is not incoherent to hold that one judges that O is beautiful 
whilst tentatively conceding (5b') that it is likely that it is not the case that O is 
beautiful. The former is a judgement of taste, the latter a concession to personal 
fallibility in light of this new evidence. The reason that this is not incoherent is that 
this is precisely the state one would be in if, having expressed a judgement, one found 
cause not to reject, but merely to be suspicious of it; cause to re-examine the object 
afresh. Remember, as Kant maintains: 
                                                          
1
  I merely stipulate the use of this terminology. While it may be held that (5b’) is assertoric (for 
example in the sense explained below) it is not an assertion concerning judgements of taste and thus 
not the kind of assertion that need be worrying in the present discussion of autonomy.  
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The judgement [of taste] of others, where unfavourable to ours, may no doubt, 
make us suspicious in respect of our own…  
Critique of Judgement, Part I, §33 
 
Indeed this characterisation adds legitimacy to (B') in showing that it is not merely 
an argument that explains autonomy in the aesthetic case, but one that accounts for the 
other features Kant maintained. It explains that, while autonomy should be maintained 
(given the requirement that a judgement be made only by one who feels the relevant 
response to O), opposing judgements will not be met with complacency.2 (B') does 
this by explaining precisely what change the lone judger will have undergone in 
moving (in the face of opposition) to (5b'). Whilst holding on to his judgement, he 
will be committed to a state in which the quasi-assertion (5b') is appropriately 
attributable. He should maintain his response to O but place less confidence in that 
response. To 'place less confidence' in a view can thus be understood as continuing to 
maintain the judgement whilst having cause to re-examine the object of that 
judgement. It is difficult to see how else we could interpret such features. 
Given the force of ‘it is likely that’ seemed more appropriately comparable to ‘it is 
likely that’ statements in the conclusions of inductive arguments, a better phrase might 
be ‘It is possible that’. This, as a reading of (B) would decrease the logical force of the 
argument; I find this entirely appropriate given the characterisation offered. But this 
suggests that (B'), as it stands, isn’t quite in the form we are after.3  
Hopkins holds that the kind of move I suggest in offering (B') is not available to 
the quasi-realist (Hopkins (2001): 181). This is because he believes (A) and (B) to be 
formally parallel. In rejecting the final steps in (B), I seem to reject the parallel move 
in (A) but this would undermine the possibility of any form of fault allocating 
argument. If I am to offer a viable account I need to show how the quasi-realist can 
hold onto (B') whilst also accepting the validity of (A). I need to show that it is 
possible to explain how deferring to others' opinions can be acceptable. 
To make this move I want to return to the differing weight of the 'likelihood' 
locution expressed in each argument. While issues of warrant will be raised in both (A) 
                                                          
2
  Thus we acknowledge and accommodate the phenomena discussed above. 
3
  Andrew McGonigal has recently argued that Hopkins’s argument is crucially enthymematic, though 
his revisions and aims differ slightly from my own. As I wish merely to open up discussion, I do not 
comment on McGonigal’s article here.  See his ‘The Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement’ British 
Journal of Aesthetics 46:4 (2006): 331-348 
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and (B), 'It is likely that I am at fault' will only carry weight in proportion to the 
assumptions qualifying the type of cases under consideration. In (A) we are taken all 
the way to the judgement whereas in (B) we conclude only that it is possible that I am 
at fault, but go no further. What distinguishes these arguments seems to be the state 
one is supposed to be in for (1a) and the state referred to in (1b). Presumably if 'I and 
my opponents disagree over whether p' then (say) I assert that p and they assert that 
¬p. However on the expressivist reading of (B) or (B') my assertion is not formed on 
the basis of a cognitive state, nor need it be in constructing the quasi-realist analogue 
to cognitive command. Whether O is beautiful or not depends on the response I feel 
towards O. But, judgements that report feelings are (in a sense) infallible in a way that 
empirical beliefs needn't be. Furthermore empirical beliefs can be formed on the basis 
of inference or testimony rather than experience. This distinction seems to be a 
contender for explaining why one could move to (4) and (5) (or their analogues) in the 
case of certain empirical judgements but not in the case of aesthetic judgements. One 
might be tempted to maintain in (A) a merely quasi-assertion (as I have put it) that it 
is only likely that (say) ¬p, but given our practice of belief formations for these kinds 
of judgements, such a tentative claim would appear dogmatic. In some cases it would 
be merely obstinate to retain one's former belief in the light of this fault consideration, 
and the assumptions entailed about these judgements and their formation. The fault 
consideration about these judgements will allow me to defer from my previously held 
belief to one that is based on the testimony of others. This is because such a move can 
constitute a legitimate kind of judgement formation for these kinds of assertion. The 
subjectivity of one’s feelings, on the other hand, should give a prima facie reason to 
hold on to them even in the face of adversity. More importantly the constraints on the 
formation of judgements that report feelings will justify the preservation of autonomy 
in the kind of cases under consideration. 
Hopkins might claim to have anticipated this strategy: ‘This is to accept that there 
are genuine fault allocating arguments with statements of the form ‘O is beautiful’ as 
conclusion, but to deny that those conclusions are judgements of taste.’ (Hopkins 
(2001): 183). Whilst I am certainly denying that the conclusion constitutes a 
judgement of taste I’m not convinced we’ve yet got to a genuine fault allocating 
argument. Perhaps I can clarify with an example. Consider that p in the first argument 
is ‘this surface is blue’. Whilst coming to believe that it is likely that the surface is in 
fact red might not stop it continuing to appear that the surface is blue, what one 
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recognises in this kind of case is that it can be rational to use something other than 
one’s own vision (i.e. we can implement the testimony of others, based on their vision) 
to form one’s judgement. Here we have a consideration which legitimises the move 
from (3) and (4) to the judgement (5a) not just an attitude about one’s initial 
judgement. The consideration is that for belief formation regarding observable 
phenomena it can be acceptable to rely on testimony. Hopkins claims that reluctance 
to move to the opposing judgement would reveal a vicious circularity if the only 
reason one can give to disallow the formation of a judgement based on testimony in 
certain cases is that the expressivist interpretation of these kinds of judgements 
forbids it. The onus is on the proponent to explain why yielding to the testimony of 
others, in just these cases, will not do. 
The force of Hopkins’ objection comes from the claim that the quasi-realist needs 
to accept the standard argument for non-aesthetic cases whilst motivating a block to 
the conclusion in aesthetic cases. However it is not clear that arguments of the form of 
(A) are standard. If this can be shown, the onus is no more on the quasi-realist to 
explain a ‘non-standard’ result, than it is on Hopkins to motivate the ‘standard’ 
interpretation. What is more, appeal to the nature of the judgements in question does 
seem to bring out the crucial difference the quasi-realist requires, for it is appeal to the 
nature of the judgements in (A) that brings out the characterisation that Hopkins takes 
as standard. This becomes apparent when one notes that autonomy isn’t only present 
in cases where the judgements concerned are purportedly expressive. Consider the 
following cases: I’m in the final round of a game show; I believe the speedboat is 
behind door number two all the audience think not. Or, I believe that God exists and 
my opponents believe that He does not.4 It is plausible in both cases to think that there 
is a fact of the matter; one of us is at fault. We are all equally competent in such 
matters having accessed the matter in the same way. (1) – (3) are satisfied but this 
doesn’t suggest a move to (4) for it is not, now, likely that I am at fault; it does not 
legitimize the change in belief of (5).5  
What distinguishes all the cases I have discussed is the way these kinds of 
judgements are formed. If we are talking about judgements formed on the basis of 
                                                          
4
  I suggest this example in response to those who might think that guessing in the game show case 
does not amount to a genuine assertion or belief that p.  I think this could be finessed - I’m going to 
have to act on my decision eventually! Hopkins also mentions plausible parallels to aesthetic autonomy 
in comedic and moral cases (Hopkins 2001: 186). 
5
 What it might make me do is return to the situation under consideration. Do they know something I 
don’t? Have I understood the rules? Am I making my judgement in the appropriate way? 
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perceptual ability; on the basis of guess-work; on faith; or judgements of taste, this 
affects whether (3) makes it likely that I am at fault – whether there is a move to (4) - 
and this question is prior to questions of the relative merits of other means of 
judgement formation that might be available. I needn’t even consider the possibility of 
yielding to the testimony of the masses if I do not take the situation to entail that my 
position lacks warrant. In this sense it does not appear that the onus is on the quasi-
realist or expressivist to explain why judgements of taste cannot be formed on the 
basis of testimony, this is a question to be answered but first one needs a clearer 
conception of the kinds of things, other than fault, that can explain divergence.6  
I’m suggesting that the fault allocating argument is, as it stands, incomplete, one 
needs to recognise the kinds of judgements under consideration as this will change 
whether or not an argument of the form of (A) is appropriate. While it is true that any 
account of autonomy needs to explain what it is about the type of judgements in 
question that differentiates them from judgements like ‘this surface is blue’, showing 
that autonomy is not just a peculiarity of the aesthetic or expressive judgement seems 
to be enough to motivate a continued interest in the project of developing a quasi-
realism about the aesthetic. That such judgements might require a certain response 
from the judger that is only achieved through acquaintance with the object would be 
precisely the kind of thing that blocks any move beyond (1)-(3) regarding the 
judgement formed; though as the quasi-realist can show, a different argument might 
progress with regard to other things, such as the attitude one has towards one’s 
judgement.7  
                                                          
6
  For example, (as it appears with the game show or God case) I and my opponents might differ in 
our responses merely because there is no epistemic transparency for the formation of judgements in the 
situation as described. McGonigal discusses the role of epistemic access in fault allocating arguments 
in (2006: 336). 
7
  I’m grateful to Michael Wilby for insightful discussion on an earlier version of this paper. 
CHRISTOPHER DOWLING 
109 
REFERENCES 
 
HOPKINS, R. (2001) 'Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement' 
European Journal of Philosophy 9:2: 166-189. 
KANT, I. (1952) Critique of Judgement, (trans.) J. C. Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
MCGONIGAL, A. (2006) ‘The Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement’ British Journal of 
Aesthetics 46:4: 331-348. 
WRIGHT, C. (1992) Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
 
 
